Power-sharing Institutions in Multicultural Societies – The Case of Switzerland

Transcript episode #6:

Hello and welcome to the rules of the game podcast, where it is my job to discuss democratic institutions. 

In today’s episode, I discuss power-sharing democratic institutions in Switzerland with my guest, Sean Müller. Power sharing is a crucial element of the success of Swiss consensus democracy. Yet it was a long and troublesome process that started with lots of social cleavages. Not only had two conflicting religious groups, the Catholics and the Protestants, to be integrated into democratic agreements. Also, four languages are spoken in the different regions, and 26 cantons have different cultures, traditions and each wants to have a say. Switzerland thus was an unlikely case to become a consociational democracy. 

Sean Müller and I discuss milestones in the development of the Swiss Constitution and its democratic institutions. Important power-sharing institutional pillars are federalism, a proportional representation electoral system, a federal council as executive government, and direct democracy. 

Dr. Sean Müller is an Assistant Professor at the University of Lausanne, specializing in Swiss and comparative federalism, territorial politics and direct democracy. Our discussion is based on a recently revised edition of the book “Swiss Democracy. Possible Solutions to Conflict in Multicultural Societies”, written by Wolf Linder and Sean Müller. I can highly recommend the book to better understand Swiss institutional development and possible implications for other multicultural societies. You can find more information on Sean Müller’s projects and work on his website, and he is also an active member on Twitter, and I link to both in the show notes. 

Now please enjoy this wide ranging conversation with Sean Müller. 

Interview:

Stephan Kyburz: Sean Müller, welcome to the Rules of the Game podcast. Very happy to have you. 

Sean Müller: Thank you for the invitation. 

Stephan Kyburz: So as usually I want to give the audience a brief introduction of your background and of your personal relationship to democracy. So what is your first memory of democracy? 

Sean Müller: Well, in Switzerland, people have to be from somewhere, somebody once said. It doesn’t matter who you are. You have to be from somewhere. I’m from the Canton of Glarus, and those of you who listen regularly to the podcast know that we still have the “Landsgemeinde” (Cantonal Assembly). So obviously one of my first memories, and that I actually remember myself, has to do with the Landsgemeinde. The assembly of citizens in free air that meets once a year to decide collective decisions. So as a kid, I was allowed to sit in front and just listen to the debates. And then when I turned 18, I was lucky to be born in March. So when May came, I was just fresh into my voting rights and I was able to participate, and I remember until this day that we had a very lively discussion going on. Me and my friends, we were standing there. But because the Landsgemeinde is also a kind of a party where you drink a lot, our main worry was to then run to the toilet, and this Democratic debate has dragged on forever and ever. And we had to decide what was more important, our personal health or the collective good. So we stayed until the end. 

Stephan Kyburz: That’s cool. That’s a very fun story connected to democracy. And interestingly, a former guest, previously, Pascal Vuichard, he had a similar kind of first experience of democracy with the Landsgemeinde, that is the cantonal assembly that I discussed in another episode. Cool, and when did you develop that interest for democratic questions, like you are very involved in research, your doing academic research at the University of Lausanne, and how far does that go back to in your life? 

Sean Müller: Well, as I said, obviously the personal connection played a role. But I don’t think I would have really gone on to study political science had I not had some kind of personal connections with the University of Fribourg that led me to attend an open day. And then I actually sat in a class on philosophy, and it was just too abstract for me, what they were speaking in philosophy. And then I spoke to a friend who was doing political sociology or a friend of a friend. And that was even more abstract, very, very structural and vague. And then, by chance, I discovered this class in political science, and I just immediately liked it. And sometimes in life, you just know that something suits you and speaks to something inside you and you can’t really pin it down. And ever since this, this whole question of, you name your podcast after the Rules of the Game, this whole question of how do these rules come about, who decides on them? Who decides who can decide the intricacies of the power dynamics of the actors? Differences between different societies, I find this a very fascinating topic, and so far my interest has not waned. On the contrary, the more I discover, the more I learn, that there is so much more yet to discover on how we actually take the decisions that we do, or that we should take for all of us. 

Stephan Kyburz: I think, especially in Switzerland, it’s this proximity to democratic decision making at the various government levels, but also through direct democracy, just creates, I think, for most people, this strong connection with democracy. And this is also what we want to talk about today. Some of the Swiss institutions that helped build that society in Switzerland, which in the beginning was, or is very multicultural in many dimensions. But somehow the country realized, or achieved to make, create this consensus democracy. And that depends on a lot of specific institutions, but also developments over time. And this is really what we want to talk about today. And maybe, let’s start with Switzerland kind of 150 or 200 years ago, what it looked like and what made it actually an unlikely case, in some respects, to become a consensus or a consociational democracy. So what are some of the characteristics of Switzerland? 

Sean Müller: So if we go 200 years back in time, I mean we arrive right after the French Revolution and sort of the birth of this notion of nationhood that all those who live within a fixed territory, have certain things in common, or they should have certain things in common. That there should be solidarity on a grand scale, also with people that we don’t know, that we don’t meet on a regular basis, that live far away. But because we live in the same territory, we should want the same things, and that we are identical and the same thing. And if you look at Switzerland, this would have been the least likely place to ever see this sense of nationhood emerge, because there were four different language groups. There were different cantons with different economic traditions with different structures. So you had the city cantons, the cities of Zurich, Basel, of Geneva. You had the rural communities where people basically just lived on subsistence economy, and you had a few feudal elites that made a lot of money with sending the poor Swiss, who could not afford food, into the army. So, mercenaries, we’re a big thing. So you had all those different, and we haven’t even talked about religions or religion. It’s hard to realize today that religion was actually the most divisive factor, not just in Europe, but especially in Switzerland. We had four civil wars dealing with religion, for different beliefs of what is the right way to live and so on so forth. So all these differences, they were all present. So we didn’t just have several languages. We didn’t just have several regions. We didn’t just have different economic and historical traditions. We had all of that, plus we had big nation state projects going on around the whole country. So you had Germany in the North, France in the West, Italy in the South. So in a way, if you had to bet your money on something you would not have betted on Switzerland becoming an independent, multinational or at least plurilingual country. You have just predicted that it would be absorbed, partitioned and absorbed into the respective bigger, more powerful nation state. Instead, the exact opposite has happened. 

Stephan Kyburz: Yeah, exactly. And so we can really summarize as Switzerland being a multicultural country with two strong religious groups, the Catholics and the Protestants, that came out from the Reformation period in the 16th century. And then we have the four different languages German, French, Italian and Romansh, that really made it an unlikely case to become a consensus democracy. And so briefly, let’s go through some of the stages of constitutional development that were important. And mainly, I would say we could also summarize that the country went from a system that was more majoritarian and in some sense winner-take-all and became more of an integrated, multi-party democracy. So the first point was, or an important point in time was obviously the writing of the modern constitution of Switzerland in 1848. And then, tell us a bit about some of the milestones in the development in the decades that followed. 

Sean Müller: It’s hard to decide where to start. Because where we start decides how we tell the story, in a way. My former supervisor once told me, history is too important to be left to the historians. It should be the political science job to explain history. So let’s do justice to historians and start in the very beginning. I mean, in the Middle Ages, there was a series of treaties signed between these different communities, rural, urban, Catholic, Protestant, mountain, valley outside, inside oriented. So over 500 years you had a tradition of treaty making. So when it came to, now we may take a big jump to 1848. When it came to 1848, this pattern of first sitting together around the table and deciding on a document was already well established. It was already a practice that had been done by the fathers, and forefathers, and the foreforefathers, not the mothers yet at that time. So there was a precedent, and at the same time, there was enough commonality among those different groups, that lead to a sort of, common denominator as to what modern Switzerland should look like back in 1848. Because even those who were in favor of a more centralized state, they did not want to abolish the cantons. Even those who wanted to have a unified economic system, they had no interest in imposing a single language. There was no interest in imposing a single language regime, because all you wanted to do was make money for the winners of the civil War in 1847. So they could all agree on a compromise, obviously some were more happy than others. But the basic compromises was that we create a new state, a new level above the cantonal level, but it’s a very minimal level. Only very few powers were delegated to that new level, was one of the most decentralized or non-centralist regimes at that time, modeled after the U.S., in some way after the US experience that predated it by some decades. And at the same time, the cantons were given a number of veto powers. And especially the losers of the civil wars of, the Catholics, rural German, but also some French speaking parts were given enough structural abilities that if they really wanted to impede the future change, they could do it. So it was not just a blanket check that was created by the winners of the civil war for themselves, for the future. But they were already cognizant that in order to create a sustainable regime, they needed to bring on board everybody and not just a simple majority. And at the same time they created institutions that facilitated the dialogue between the different groups. So rather than just separating, you go your way, we go our way. I don’t think they had the intention or they were thinking in terms of political science series, centripetalism, to create common institutions. But there was a two chamber parliament created which somehow forced even the elite of the losing side, of the antagonists of centralization, to come to what was then the capital Bern, and speak to the winners. And this sort of helped create and forge a common entity, at least among the elite. Because in a way, they were all in the same boat. They all were elected and wanted to be re-elected. So why not join forces and help each other out in terms of creating a common good for everyone? So that was 1848. Obviously, it was just the men. It was just the men that had a certain revenue, that we’re married and didn’t commit any crime that were allowed to participate in all those affairs political. And then with industrialization, there was sort of the first new player, new kid on the block, workers and then the Socialist Party Socialist Party was actually the first party created as a party at the national level in Switzerland. Because the winners of the civil war they didn’t need to organize themselves as a party. They had already won. They were already there. They were already in all the powers that mattered. So all the seven ministers, they were from that party, which was not really a party, was just like a common, a boys club. We would call it the Manchester liberalism or other sorts of liberalism. So the Socialists were the first forced to really rock the boat in 1860 1870s and, but even the Socialists, they were not strong enough to really rock the boat fully because of Switzerland’s decentralized nature. There was never really one dominant city like France or London that created a mass proletariat around, or within the city limits that helped mobilise socialist or communist forces. Everything is always decentralized in Switzerland, in the different cities where industrialization took off, or even in the rural communities where industrialization took off. So that was a disadvantage for the Socialists. But it was an advantage for Swiss politics because being strong but not strong enough forced the Socialists to join forces with the other excluded force of the new state, the Catholic conservatives. So it’s like the devil and the angel shaking hands. And I leave it up to you to decide who is the devil and who is the angel. But these two sides joined forces because they were both excluded by the liberal elite. And, although pursuing completely different interests, Catholic conservativism and at that time still the social revolutionary ideas, they joined forces in pushing for a greater openness of the system. So they brought the popular initiative on partial constitutional change onto the agenda and had it passed. They brought also proportional elections for the national council onto the agenda. That was something demanded by the two main opposition forces against the liberal elite. And so it’s actually only since 1891 that we see the direct democratic elements play a bigger role, together with 1874, when we have the facultative referendum. So at the end of the 19th century, we have the two main instruments of direct democracy. In 1919, 1st elections for the National Council according to the proportional elections where the space, the political space opened up also for other forces, and not just the liberal elite which, through gerrymandering, through other tricks of the trade, managed to hold onto power although being a minority. And it’s actually only since the beginning of the 20th century that Switzerland is really entering the path of power-sharing, at least in that dimension. Obviously, it was always federal, so the vertical division of power was always there and has, in a sense, weakened over time, whereas the horizontal division of power between the government and the parties and the two chambers of parliament has gained in importance, to the extent that today we have a debate whether seven ministers in government is enough to accommodate all the political forces that have sprung up and that play a role for the different segments of society. 

Stephan Kyburz: All right, thanks a lot for this overview. That’s very interesting. And just to recap quickly to, kind of emphasize again these important elements. So kind of direct democracy was important in shaping these institutions. So the popular initiative for a full revision of the constitution was actually already included in the constitution 1848, and then in 1874 for the revision, or the referendum was included. And finally in 1891, the popular initiative for the partial revision of the constitution was included, and that helped to essentially reshape other institutions like the electoral law. So that is really an important step. Only the partial revision of the Constitution through a popular initiative allowed essentially to introduce proportional representation. And proportional representation became really an important element of Swiss democratic institutions at all levels, not only at the national level but also at the lower levels of government. And so now, I think it would be good to give some further insights into the power-sharing institutions. So obviously power-sharing can be described in a more general sense that, you know, power is shared among different regions among different parties. So the multiparty system, but also in a federal level. This in contrast to a winner-take-all politics, or a winner-take-all system, where usually one party has a strong majority, like we see, for example, in the United Kingdom. Now, the power-sharing institutions, they were developed over time. As I said, for example, the proportional representation was included at all levels. And why was proportional representation so important in the development of the consensus democracy. 

Sean Müller: I think we need to look at things backwards. So when we are confronted with the law as it is today, we want to know how this law came about. So who makes the laws? Now, the laws are typically made by parliament. Of course they have their advisers. There is the bureaucracy. There are interest groups that try to influence parliamentarians that try to place their parliamentarians in the key positions where they can actually write the law the way they want it. But it comes down to parliament. Parliament is tasked with making the law, it’s the legislative. So how do we know who enters Parliament? Well, that’s the electoral system. The electoral system decides how the votes are translated into seats. So it’s eminently important to know the rules of the game of the electoral game. How can we change it? How can we change the rules of the game where those who profit from the game decide on the rules? So the partial initiative, the initiative on partial constitutional change. It took three attempts by the Catholic Conservatives and the Socialists. Only at the third try the majority of citizens and cantons accepted this initiative, so that National Council had to be elected using proportionality. Henceforth, what I want to say with that is that nothing is given, nothing is automatic. Actors had to fight to get a share of political power, and in a way, it’s kind of a functional story. Once you start opening up public space to one group, you allow that group to thrive and to find other allies. And they joined forces and they get a little bit more of the political cake. And then other groups also want to have a bit of the cake. So they also joined forces, and there is even more. So the situation we have today can really only be explained by looking at the whole evolution of power sharing. In fact, today, it’s hard to find an institution where power is not shared. Even the Swiss people, you would think that, okay, Switzerland has direct democracy, so once the people decide, that’s really the institution we turn to. But guess what? When you want to change the Constitution, you need a majority of the people and of the cantons. And how each canton votes is decided by the people in that canton. So it’s perfectly possible, and it happens, in fact, more and more that you have conflicting majorities of the same people just because you count them differently, how they are distributed territorially. So even the people have to share power with themselves. So there’s no institution where there is no power sharing. Now, which institution you want to look at first depends whether you’re an elitist or a populist. We can start with the people and discuss the differences within the people and the parties and the regions and the languages. Or we can start with the government and look at how the government operates with seven members that, formally at least, all have the same amount of power. And yet they are elected based on a party ticket, which means somehow they have to cater to the party interest. But at the same time, they have to share their party interests with other powers. 

Stephan Kyburz: And that is really a specialty, I would say of Switzerland, in the sense, that the government is consisting of seven members and is a body, a council that together decides on on on government issues. Now that depended a lot on proportional representation as well, or it kind of, only proportional representation allowed for a better representation in government because the parliament is electing the Federal Council. So the Federal Council is an institution which is quite unique for Switzerland. But it’s a very strong power sharing institution. Why do you think that not more other countries use that type of institution. Do we know that, or is there a reason? Or is it just that just other institutions were more, I don’t know, present internationally and were adopted more often? 

Sean Müller: It’s a good question. I don’t think anyone has the answer to why not more countries adopt the Swiss system of having seven, or it could be nine. It could be five. It could be 11 equally powerful ministers elected by parliament. But once they’re elected, they’re not accountable to parliament during the whole term of their mandate. Nor can they dissolve parliament. So it’s a peculiar mix of a presidential-parliamentary system, plus there are seven and not just one. Obviously path dependencies play a big role. Several countries chose a system and then stuck with it because it’s somehow always worked for them. So why change a winning team. In Switzerland, seven was kind of the agreed upon number back in 1848, in allusion to the directorate, the French directorate that had five. It was a big enough number to give everybody a little bit. So already, even though there was just one party in quotation marks in power in 1848, the members of the government represented different areas, so they were from different cantons. For instance, Canton of Bern and Canton of Zurich have almost always had a representative in the federal government since 1848. At the same time, there were always at least two Catholics. Obviously, these were Catholics with the liberal inclination and not a conservative inclination, but Catholics nonetheless. It could have been perfectly possible to occupy the seven seats already back in 1848 with seven hardcore liberals, from the seven winners of the civil war. But instead it was chosen, it was a liberal choice to give the minority also at least some share of the power. I suspect it was a self interested choice in order that decisions are applied and adhered to. Better to include and broaden the alliance to ease the application. Other countries have chosen different paths. Doesn’t mean that other paths are wrong. Doesn’t mean that this is the only path, and our path or the Swiss path has some disadvantages as well. So no system is perfect, so you have seven, they need to agree. What if they can’t agree? Or what if they don’t abide by a lot of the informal, a lot of a lot of Swiss politics is decided or regulated by informal rules. So, for instance, the council can very well decide with a majority vote within. But towards the outside, it is expected that each member defends the decision once taken by the council, even if you personally, and even if your party strongly opposes that decision. So depending on who you are, which party you’re from, it forces you almost into a schizophrenic role because you have to wear two heads or you have to leave your party hat from before you entered government, decide and adopt the new hat, you’re now a member of the council. And that can be looked at as a disadvantage because how do we know who takes decisions if it’s all of them? If it’s the council without a face or seven faces, who do we blame? If things go wrong, it’s easier to have one person and replace her or him than replace all seven. It’s much more revolutionary in Switzerland is not the country for revolutions. It’s much more evolutionary. 

Stephan Kyburz: Yeah, exactly. And also, obviously our accountability is a big, big issue, like in the U.S. system, for example, where you have a president, it’s clear who is accountable, right? And with a body that is consisting of seven members and they are elected by parliament, accountability is obviously an issue, and they were tries to actually have the Federal Council elected by the people. But that proposal was rejected. Interestingly, also this power-sharing executive councils, they are used also at the cantonal level, so there’s different versions, different sizes, some are elected by the people as well. So there’s really the element of federalism that now comes in, where we see this experimentation of different versions of the same institution at the subnational level. And I think that’s also an important element of the Swiss democracy. Because a lot of the institutions like, for example, proportional representation, have been tried before at the subnational level and have, and different cantons have experimented with them. And then finally there was kind of a consensus at the end which institution might be the most suitable at the national level. The federalism is an important element as well, and that was crucial, I would say, to balance power between the central and the subnational level, but also to integrate all the various cantons in one kind of central government institution, so that all the regions, all the languages, but also the religions were balanced. And so I’d like to discuss federalism a little bit more in detail. What do you think are the most important elements of Swiss federalism and how did they help to include the religions and the languages? 

Sean Müller: I think if we speak about Swiss federalism, we have to realize that it’s a bottom-up affair. So the question is not, as it is in other countries, such as Belgium or India or even Germany, how much power do we decentralize to the local level? But the question in Switzerland has always been how much power do we centralize? Because those who held power initially, and in some domains still hold power to a very large extent, are the cantons. So that the point of departure was already a non-centralist state of affairs where you had 25 or 26 members of the family, and at least a large majority of them had to agree to now delegate something to the head of the family, or to the grandfather or something that is just above and higher than them. So that’s one thing, and the other thing is that federalism is not just division of power, but it’s also co-oporation. So for all the things that you divide and separate and hand out to the little cantons, there is always a domain where the national level is in charge, but includes the cantons in its decision making. So we talked about the two chambers of parliament. There is a whole half of the parliament, or the Council of States. Each Canton gets two seats no matter their population size, no matter the language, no matter their historical origin. So also, when the canton of Jura was created in 1979 out of the fringes of the Canton of Bern, it was accepted as a full canton and given two full seats in the Council of States. So you have the equality principle that plays a role, but you also have the co-determinations of cantonal, nowadays it’s the members of the Council of States are elected by the people. So it’s not the cantonal governments that sit in the second chamber, as in Germany. But it’s at least the cantonal, or at least people there perceive themselves as defending also their cantonal interest. So you always have kind of a second opinion at the national level. You don’t just have the national outlook, the people, the people’s chamber, the National Council that is elected using proportionality to give a better sense of the variety of preferences that exist in society, and Swiss society. But you also have the Senate, the Council of States, to provide the other perspective, the territorial perspective, which oftentimes goes in the same way but sometimes also has a radically different view because they are tasked, at least that’s the idea, to defend federalism in the sense of defending the division of powers between the national and the cantonal level, but also between the cantons of the cantonal borders between the cantons, they also play a great deal for federalism. And they are also jealously guarded. We haven’t had a single case of serious entertaining, seriously entertaining cantonal mergers. There were two votations, or three in total, for two cases, and both failed, clamorously. Nobody wants to merge his canton or her canton away with another Canton. 

Stephan Kyburz: Yeah, exactly. And this territorial aspect of federalism is really important. And I think also helped the people to kind of balance, to give up power to the central or to the cantonal and the central government, but also keep some aspects and the possibility to shape institutions at the local and the cantonal level in their own way. So that was important for religious minorities, but also for all the cantons that have different cultures, different traditions, different dialects, et cetera. So that balance between giving up power to the central state while retaining quite a lot of decision power at the regional or local level, that was important, and not only in terms of political power but also in terms of financial, like tax matters. So only a minor share of taxes are actually paid to the central government, and the bigger part of the taxes you pay are actually staying within the cantonal boundaries and help shape public goods at the local level. So maybe we can also say that the federalism in Switzerland is really quite strong, also at the very local level. 

Stephan Kyburz: There are two other elements of Swiss federalism, one is the intercantonal cooperation and the other the fiscal equalization mechanism. The intercantonal cooperation is essentially agreements between two cantons to jointly provide public goods or work together in a certain area. For example, in universities that are usually located in urban areas, in urban cantons, they receive contributions by cantons around, which are more rural but are still benefiting from the knowledge hub that a city or a university canton generates. So, for example, between the two cantons, Basel City and “Landschaft”, the rural areas of Basel. There are over 100 agreements, in horizontal cooperation. The other element is the fiscal equalization mechanism, which essentially a transfer from richer cantons to poorer cantons. So this is also an element that tries to balance, or tries to balance resources between cantons. So maybe you can comment on these two elements as well to get, like a full picture of the federalism in Switzerland. 

Sean Müller: It’s absolutely important to not forget the horizontal dimension of federalism. So I take the inter-cantonal cooperation first. I mean, we had a colleague of mine, did his PhD on that. And just the task of finding out how many contracts exist between the different cantons and are currently enforced took him a couple of months. Because there is no central database of all these contracts, because every Canton autonomously decides if they want to do a contract with who, on what, and sometimes they archive them better or worse. Sometimes these contacts are very old, and he actually unearthed a couple of contracts and informed some of the cantons that  they were a member of that contract. Although the contract was like 100 years old, but it had never been resigned, so it was still technically, I mean, some of these things are minor issues, like agreement on where exactly, the border between two cantons goes, if there is a river and the river changes. So we’re not talking high politics. But some of those things are actually important. For example, there is a major treaty on harmonizing the education system. Because education, primary education is still a cantonal domain. But to avoid a situation where if a family moves from one canton to another, they have to completely change the text books. And they’re completely lost because the system is so different. Cantons, more or less voluntarily under pressure from the federal level, and from some of the parties, agreed to at least to harmonize their curricula and agreed on a common structure for what kids should learn in the primary school. But this is just an illustration of the breath of the number and type of treaties that are enforced. The beauty of the treaties is that they are extremely flexible. So as a canton you can join and you can leave. There is no federal law that mandates you to join or leave, so it’s up to you. It’s up to the cantonal government, parliament, citizenry to decide on whether to stay or leave, or modify a treaty. But the flexibility is at the same time, rather inflexible. Because once you’re part of a treaty with 5, 6, 10 other cantons and you want to leave or you want to modify and the others don’t want to modify, there’s not much you can do. Then you have to either leave. It’s like an international treaty. You depend on others. And the irony is that these treaties were, the idea of the treaties is to safeguard cantonal autonomy, to avoid that the federal level takes over. But the treaties themselves infringe on the cantonal autonomy. It’s all a question of how many treaties you sign with how many other players, like the international level again. We want to safeguards Swiss sovereignty, so we sign up to counter terrorism or climate change treaties. But at the same time, we agree to abide by certain rules that limit our freedom to make decisions, but at least it’s for our own good, so that’s for the intercantonal cooperation. Related to that, we have the fiscal equalization system that is, in a way, very complex because there are three different tracks and one is provisional, and then the fourth one was added to change the system a couple of years ago. But at heart, it is very simple. At heart, the system takes money from the rich cantons and gives it to the poor cantons. And on top of that, the federal level foots the bill to 60%. So it’s the confederation, the national level and seven or six richer cantons, it depends on which year we look at, that transfers some money to the 17 or 18 or 19 poorer cantons by some commonly agreed standard. And they do that why? Why would they do that? They do that in a way out of solidarity, because in Switzerland we’re all in the same boat. But I also do that in a way out of necessity to keep up their own autonomy. Because there was some pressure you mentioned the tax system that is very much decentralized. Decentralized is a nice word. We can also say it’s heavily biased that richer cantons can afford to have lower taxes, and that attracts even more richer people that come there. So the land prices and the houses, the cost of living goes up. So people who can’t afford poor people are driven out and more richer people come. So it’s like a virtuous spiral for those who were there first, they become richer and richer. And where do these people go? They go to the poorer cantons, where land prices are lower but taxes are higher. So the poor get poorer and the rich get richer, thanks to federalism and the tax competition. So the pressure built up to kind of limit the extent of that system, or at least to provide for, like a common benchmark below which no canton should fall. So it was agreed that, in a long process, it was agreed that 85% of the national mean should be what every campaign has in its own pockets. So the richer cantons pay, so in a way, it’s like back in the old days that led to the Reformation, when you can just buy your freedom, you can buy your tax freedom by paying some money into the fiscal equalization system to satisfy those poor cantons to satisfy the left wing parties, and that they stop pressuring for a centralization of the tax system. So in a way, it’s the downside of federalism that you have inequality. You have huge inequalities, depending on whether you live in Canton of Jura or Canton of Zug, as a family with two kids, you pay either 2000 francs in cantonal taxes or 8000 francs in cantonal taxes every year. It’s four times as much in the two, the bracket, the range is so high. But at the same time it again shows the beauty because there is a problem and there was a process and it led to a compromise. So the money is shared like the powers is shared. Not all the money is shared. The richer canton still get richer, but not so fast as they did under the old system and the poor cantons, they get a little less poor, but they are still poor. Although they receive money that helps them unconditionally. They can use the money for whatever purposes they want to use it for.

Stephan Kyburz: Cool, thanks a lot for that compliment to the other institution, which is, less talked about, I’d say, but also this establishment of this quite complex equalization mechanisms and also the cooperation between the cantons is only possible, I think, due to this kind of power sharing consensus type of institution that allows for a very fine tuned solution to be found by all parties involved. And it’s also, I think, you know, it took time, those institutions have to be developed, adjusted and so on, until a solution is found that really satisfies, you know, more or less everyone. But also, this discussion is always ongoing. So let’s wrap up the discussion here. Because I think we have given a good overview of the various aspects of Swiss consensus democracy and how a country that was initially quite divided, with some religious groups being in conflict, but also of the four languages and the various different cultures that were integrated into that type of democracy and was a long process, actually, of finding solutions. Now, just at the end, I’d still like to ask you a few questions, a couple of questions that, I think, it’s interesting for listeners to hear. The first one would be, what if you could change an institution, just top-down, essentially, if you could change one, what institution would you change? 

Sean Müller: I think if I could, I would make parliament more professional because for as much as I believe in direct democracy and I told you in the beginning my very first experience was a very direct way of experiencing democracy, citizens directly meeting and deciding on political questions. As much as I believe in direct democracy, I also believe in the in the power-sharing idea. We need a countervailing force, we need a place with elected officials that have the time and the skills and also the motivation, inspiration to really think about questions thoroughly, and listening to different sides and debating with each other, taking into consideration different points of view, associations, cantons and international studies, us scientists, and that institution can only be parliament. So, ironically, we need a strong parliament, or I think we need a stronger parliament than we have now to make overall democracy work better. 

Stephan Kyburz: I totally agree in the sense that parliament is such an important institution. And a lot of, there are actually a lot of calls for in other countries for direct democracy or, um, citizens assemblies, as kind of on a random mechanism basis, etcetera. There’s lots of discussion out there about these institutions. But in the end it is a strong parliament, a strong legislative body that creates, you know, solutions that kind of satisfies all the different needs. And that is not really possible in the direct democratic sense, because that process is very involving. Then the final question is: do you have any books that you could recommend regarding Swiss democracy or more in general?

Sean Müller: There is the book by Jonathan Steinberg. It’s actually entitled “Why Switzerland?” If you open it, you see immediately that it’s a play of words. So why should you know about Switzerland? It’s an interesting country, as we just discussed, it’s peculiar, it’s different from others. It’s in a way even archaic, exotic. But the other question he asks also is, why is there still a Switzerland? How come it survived for so long and even became, in a way, a model and thrived, provides inspiration for other contexts in terms of federalism, in terms of direct democracy in terms of power sharing. So “Why Switzerland?” summarizes not just the book, but also some of the questions that we in political science ask ourselves a lot these days. 

Stephan Kyburz: Cool. Thanks for sharing that recommendation. Okay, let’s end here. Thank you very much, Sean Müller, for being a guest on my podcast. And, let’s see, we might be able to do an update at some later stage. 

Sean Müller: Thank you for having me.